Deschaine, Gordon Edward (Pilot Officer)

Lancaster Mk.I/III EE106

Bombing Antheor Viaduct France 1943-September-16 to 1943-September-16

(B) Sqn (RAF) Woodhall Spa

British National Archives, Kew (AIR 50/281/217) have the following "Report on Loss of Aircraft on Operations" covering incident in which he was in crew:

Aircraft: Lancaster EE106 - "E" of 619 Squadron.

Date of Loss: 16/17 September 1943

Cause of Loss: Lack of fuel followed by ditching; probable navigational error.

Target: Anthor Viaduct

Information from all members of the crew:Pilot: Flight Lieutenant Jones, S.E.J., captain;Navigator: Flying Officer Holding, A.D.;Wireless Operator: Flight Sergeant Faux, R.G.;Flight Engineer: Sergeant Brooks, H.E.;Bomb Aimer: Sergeant Descaine, E.;Air Gunner, Mid-Upper: Sergeant Cook, C.S.;Air Gunner, Rear: Flying Officer Cartwright, A.W.E.P.

Briefed Route: Selsey Bill - Cabourg - 47.35N 00.45E - 45.12N 05.42E - Cap Ferrat - Antheor Viaduct - St. Raphael - 46.30N 01.00E - 46.30N 02.30W - 46.15N 05.50W - Predannack.

Narrative:

GEE was unsatisfactory on the outward journey up to about 4ÌŠ E when it came on and was serviceable as far as approximately 6ÌŠ E when it again became unserviceable. GEE showed the aircraft to be about 30 miles north of the track and the course was corrected. The Met forecast gave winds of 30-40 m.p.h. on the outward journey and light and variable at the target, but it was estimated that the wind was backing from westerly to southerly and increasing to 70-80 m.p.h. The speed was kept at 155 I.A.S. as instructed for the outward journey and the compass was checked.

The aircraft crossed the coast at Cap Ferrat and circled the rendevous island until the squadron had assembled. E/619 was due at the renndevous at 00.30 hours and the E.T.A. was 00.40 hours. The aircraft was the last to bomb the target at 1.20 hours from 300 feet, the target being identified visually. A small amount of light flak was encountered but no damage was noticed at the time. Delayed action bombs were used and no results were observed.

Height was gained over the sea to 6,000 feet and the compass was checked (method not given). Course was set 288ÌŠto allow for an estimated 60 m.p.h. southerly wind. There is some possible confusion here, in the story as told as to whether courses were "True" or "Magnetic". The Navigator sais "True" while the pilot at first said "Magnetic" but they finally agreed that "True" was correct. The aircraft climbed to 12,000 feet for the homeward journey and entered cloud at 8,000-12,000 feet, flying in cloud continually until the descent was made later at the estimated position of the French coast. GEE was unserviceable and the navigation was all by dead reckoning. As the winds to the north has been westerly and lighter on the outward journey, course was altered to 295ÌŠ between Long. 2ÌŠand 3ÌŠE. At the outward position by D.R. of 46.30N 01.08E course was altered to 270ÌŠ at an estimated time of between 03.45 hours and 04.00 hours.

At the E.T.A. French coast (04.15 hours) they descended and broke cloud at 6,000 feet, expecting to cross the French coast. Instead they found themselves over a lighted town which they thought must be in Spain and it was realized for the first time they were off track. Course was altered to 330ÌŠ for about 50 minutes and an M.F. fix was then asked for (approximately 05.05 hours). As Plympton was unable to plot they they were given a Q.T.E. of 200ÌŠ from Plympton (05.30 hours). At this time they were still inland. The coast was crossed at 05.50 hours and an S.O.S. fix was asked for. No reply was received except letter "K" reported. It is noted here that the last was heard of E/619 by the home base was a fix at 05.55 hours, position [mutilated word] 43.N 06.17E which E/619 did not receive.

The upper sky cleared and they were able to get an Astrofix 120 miles W.N.W. of Santander. (Black plotting from this would indicate that the course to the lighted town may have been about 50ÌŠ off the briefed route).

The Flight Engineer checked the petrol and it was found to be only sufficient to reach approximately 48ÌŠ N. Latitude, near the Brest peninsula. The captain decided that, rather than be forced down in enemy waters, it was preferable to proceed in the direction of Gibralter, though he did not hope to reach it. As they had no map of Spain they followed round the coast about five miles off.

About 12 miles north of Operto (time approximately 07.00-07.15 hours), it was decided to land and, as there was a heavy ground haze over the land, it was considered preferable to come down on the sea. The electrical apparatus was destroyed (V.H.F., I.F.F., GEE and MONICA) and the aircraft was put down on the sea about 200 yards off shore. The crew took to the dinghy but were picked up and taken to shore by some Portugese fishermen.

The aircraft was washed ashore and some light flak damage holes were found in the port mainplane, probably from the Viaduct defences as the crew did not think they were fired vat over Spain. The crew were soon taken in charge by the authorities and removed, but as far as they are aware no attempt at salvage was made by the Portugese authorities and they presume that the aircraft was allowed to lie and be broken up by the sea.

The following additional information was obtained from the crew. Prior to the operation the aircraft had been on a three-day inspection and compass check, and had not been flown since. The fuel load was 2,150 gallons. Three runs were made over the Target Area at high boost and high revs. No other use of high boost or hot air was made. There was no excessive climbing apart from that planned and only slight hoar frost on the windows was observed.source: Hugh Halliday