Deschaine, Gordon Edward
Interned Prisoner 1943-09-16
Birth Date: 1922-January-07
Born:
Home:
Enlistment: into No. 8 recruiting centre RCAF in Windsor Ontario
Enlistment Date: 1941-08-04
Decorations: DFC
Service
RCAF
Unit
619 (B) Sqn- Squadron (RAF)
Ad Altiora To higher things
Base
Woodhall Spa
Rank
Pilot Officer
Position
Sergeant
Service Numbers
(R109929/J93784)
Target
Antheor Viaduct France
DESCHAINE, Warrant Officer (now P/O) Gordon Edward (R109929/J93784) - Distinguished Flying Cross - No.75 (New Zealand) Squadron
Born 7 January 1922. Enlisted in Windsor, 4 August 1941 and posted to No.1 Manning Depot. Posted elsewhere, 20 August 1941. To No.5 ITS, 25 September 1941; promoted LAC, 22 November 1941; to No.9 AOS , 6 December 1941; to No.4 BGS, 14 March 1942; graduated and promoted Sergeant, 25 April 1942; posted that date to No.2 ANS; graduated 25 May 1942 but not posted until 9 June 1942 when sent to No.5 Manning Depot.
To Eastern Air Command, 18 June 1942; to RAF overseas, 12 July 1942. To No.619 Squadron, May 1943. Posted from No.31 Base to No.75 (NZ) Squadron, 7 November 1944 in crew of Flying Officer J.H. McDonald (whose operations covered the period 20 November 1944 to 29 January 1945; posted February 1945.)
Commissioned 28 February 1945. Repatriated 14 May 1945. To No.1 Air Command, 27 May 1945 and posted that date to No.16 SFTS. To Release Centre, 15 August 1945. Released 20 August 1945, to settle in Windsor, Ontario. Rejoined RCAF, 12 February 1956 to 1 November 1965 (Auxiliary, No.2401 Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron).source: Hugh Halliday
Pilot Officer Gordon "Ed" Deschaine DFC, Log Book Analysis
Library and Archives Canada Service Files (may not exist)Lancaster Mk.I/III EE106
Bombing Antheor Viaduct France 1943-September-16 to 1943-September-16
(B) Sqn (RAF) Woodhall Spa
British National Archives, Kew (AIR 50/281/217) have the following "Report on Loss of Aircraft on Operations" covering incident in which he was in crew:
Aircraft: Lancaster EE106 - "E" of 619 Squadron.
Date of Loss: 16/17 September 1943
Cause of Loss: Lack of fuel followed by ditching; probable navigational error.
Target: Anthor Viaduct
Information from all members of the crew:Pilot: Flight Lieutenant Jones, S.E.J., captain;Navigator: Flying Officer Holding, A.D.;Wireless Operator: Flight Sergeant Faux, R.G.;Flight Engineer: Sergeant Brooks, H.E.;Bomb Aimer: Sergeant Descaine, E.;Air Gunner, Mid-Upper: Sergeant Cook, C.S.;Air Gunner, Rear: Flying Officer Cartwright, A.W.E.P.
Briefed Route: Selsey Bill - Cabourg - 47.35N 00.45E - 45.12N 05.42E - Cap Ferrat - Antheor Viaduct - St. Raphael - 46.30N 01.00E - 46.30N 02.30W - 46.15N 05.50W - Predannack.
Narrative:
GEE was unsatisfactory on the outward journey up to about 4ÌŠ E when it came on and was serviceable as far as approximately 6ÌŠ E when it again became unserviceable. GEE showed the aircraft to be about 30 miles north of the track and the course was corrected. The Met forecast gave winds of 30-40 m.p.h. on the outward journey and light and variable at the target, but it was estimated that the wind was backing from westerly to southerly and increasing to 70-80 m.p.h. The speed was kept at 155 I.A.S. as instructed for the outward journey and the compass was checked.
The aircraft crossed the coast at Cap Ferrat and circled the rendevous island until the squadron had assembled. E/619 was due at the renndevous at 00.30 hours and the E.T.A. was 00.40 hours. The aircraft was the last to bomb the target at 1.20 hours from 300 feet, the target being identified visually. A small amount of light flak was encountered but no damage was noticed at the time. Delayed action bombs were used and no results were observed.
Height was gained over the sea to 6,000 feet and the compass was checked (method not given). Course was set 288ÌŠto allow for an estimated 60 m.p.h. southerly wind. There is some possible confusion here, in the story as told as to whether courses were "True" or "Magnetic". The Navigator sais "True" while the pilot at first said "Magnetic" but they finally agreed that "True" was correct. The aircraft climbed to 12,000 feet for the homeward journey and entered cloud at 8,000-12,000 feet, flying in cloud continually until the descent was made later at the estimated position of the French coast. GEE was unserviceable and the navigation was all by dead reckoning. As the winds to the north has been westerly and lighter on the outward journey, course was altered to 295ÌŠ between Long. 2ÌŠand 3ÌŠE. At the outward position by D.R. of 46.30N 01.08E course was altered to 270ÌŠ at an estimated time of between 03.45 hours and 04.00 hours.
At the E.T.A. French coast (04.15 hours) they descended and broke cloud at 6,000 feet, expecting to cross the French coast. Instead they found themselves over a lighted town which they thought must be in Spain and it was realized for the first time they were off track. Course was altered to 330ÌŠ for about 50 minutes and an M.F. fix was then asked for (approximately 05.05 hours). As Plympton was unable to plot they they were given a Q.T.E. of 200ÌŠ from Plympton (05.30 hours). At this time they were still inland. The coast was crossed at 05.50 hours and an S.O.S. fix was asked for. No reply was received except letter "K" reported. It is noted here that the last was heard of E/619 by the home base was a fix at 05.55 hours, position [mutilated word] 43.N 06.17E which E/619 did not receive.
The upper sky cleared and they were able to get an Astrofix 120 miles W.N.W. of Santander. (Black plotting from this would indicate that the course to the lighted town may have been about 50ÌŠ off the briefed route).
The Flight Engineer checked the petrol and it was found to be only sufficient to reach approximately 48ÌŠ N. Latitude, near the Brest peninsula. The captain decided that, rather than be forced down in enemy waters, it was preferable to proceed in the direction of Gibralter, though he did not hope to reach it. As they had no map of Spain they followed round the coast about five miles off.
About 12 miles north of Operto (time approximately 07.00-07.15 hours), it was decided to land and, as there was a heavy ground haze over the land, it was considered preferable to come down on the sea. The electrical apparatus was destroyed (V.H.F., I.F.F., GEE and MONICA) and the aircraft was put down on the sea about 200 yards off shore. The crew took to the dinghy but were picked up and taken to shore by some Portugese fishermen.
The aircraft was washed ashore and some light flak damage holes were found in the port mainplane, probably from the Viaduct defences as the crew did not think they were fired vat over Spain. The crew were soon taken in charge by the authorities and removed, but as far as they are aware no attempt at salvage was made by the Portugese authorities and they presume that the aircraft was allowed to lie and be broken up by the sea.
The following additional information was obtained from the crew. Prior to the operation the aircraft had been on a three-day inspection and compass check, and had not been flown since. The fuel load was 2,150 gallons. Three runs were made over the Target Area at high boost and high revs. No other use of high boost or hot air was made. There was no excessive climbing apart from that planned and only slight hoar frost on the windows was observed.source: Hugh Halliday
Avro Lancaster
Canadian Warplane Heritage Museum
The Avro Lancaster is a British Second World War heavy bomber. It was designed and manufactured by Avro as a contemporary of the Handley Page Halifax, both bombers having been developed to the same specification, as well as the Short Stirling, all three aircraft being four-engined heavy bombers adopted by the Royal Air Force (RAF) during the same wartime era.
The Lancaster has its origins in the twin-engine Avro Manchester which had been developed during the late 1930s in response to the Air Ministry Specification P.13/36 for a capable medium bomber for "world-wide use". Originally developed as an evolution of the Manchester (which had proved troublesome in service and was retired in 1942), the Lancaster was designed by Roy Chadwick and powered by four Rolls-Royce Merlins and in one version, Bristol Hercules engines. It first saw service with RAF Bomber Command in 1942 and as the strategic bombing offensive over Europe gathered momentum, it was the main aircraft for the night-time bombing campaigns that followed. As increasing numbers of the type were produced, it became the principal heavy bomber used by the RAF, the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and squadrons from other Commonwealth and European countries serving within the RAF, overshadowing the Halifax and Stirling. Wikipedia
Lancaster Bomber
Wikipedia
Harold A Skaarup Web PageLancaster EE106 Mk.I/III - Bombing Antheor Viaduct France - 1943-09-16 to 1943-09-16
6 Group Unavailable
British National Archives, Kew (AIR 50/281/217) have the following "Report on Loss of Aircraft on Operations" covering incident in which he was in crew:
Aircraft: Lancaster EE106 - "E" of 619 Squadron.
Date of Loss: 16/17 September 1943
Cause of Loss: Lack of fuel followed by ditching; probable navigational error.
Target: Anthor Viaduct
Information from all members of the crew:Pilot: Flight Lieutenant Jones, S.E.J., captain;Navigator: Flying Officer Holding, A.D.;Wireless Operator: Flight Sergeant Faux, R.G.;Flight Engineer: Sergeant Brooks, H.E.;Bomb Aimer: Sergeant Descaine, E.;Air Gunner, Mid-Upper: Sergeant Cook, C.S.;Air Gunner, Rear: Flying Officer Cartwright, A.W.E.P.
Briefed Route: Selsey Bill - Cabourg - 47.35N 00.45E - 45.12N 05.42E - Cap Ferrat - Antheor Viaduct - St. Raphael - 46.30N 01.00E - 46.30N 02.30W - 46.15N 05.50W - Predannack.
Narrative:
GEE was unsatisfactory on the outward journey up to about 4ÌŠ E when it came on and was serviceable as far as approximately 6ÌŠ E when it again became unserviceable. GEE showed the aircraft to be about 30 miles north of the track and the course was corrected. The Met forecast gave winds of 30-40 m.p.h. on the outward journey and light and variable at the target, but it was estimated that the wind was backing from westerly to southerly and increasing to 70-80 m.p.h. The speed was kept at 155 I.A.S. as instructed for the outward journey and the compass was checked.
The aircraft crossed the coast at Cap Ferrat and circled the rendevous island until the squadron had assembled. E/619 was due at the renndevous at 00.30 hours and the E.T.A. was 00.40 hours. The aircraft was the last to bomb the target at 1.20 hours from 300 feet, the target being identified visually. A small amount of light flak was encountered but no damage was noticed at the time. Delayed action bombs were used and no results were observed.
Height was gained over the sea to 6,000 feet and the compass was checked (method not given). Course was set 288ÌŠto allow for an estimated 60 m.p.h. southerly wind. There is some possible confusion here, in the story as told as to whether courses were "True" or "Magnetic". The Navigator sais "True" while the pilot at first said "Magnetic" but they finally agreed that "True" was correct. The aircraft climbed to 12,000 feet for the homeward journey and entered cloud at 8,000-12,000 feet, flying in cloud continually until the descent was made later at the estimated position of the French coast. GEE was unserviceable and the navigation was all by dead reckoning. As the winds to the north has been westerly and lighter on the outward journey, course was altered to 295ÌŠ between Long. 2ÌŠand 3ÌŠE. At the outward position by D.R. of 46.30N 01.08E course was altered to 270ÌŠ at an estimated time of between 03.45 hours and 04.00 hours.
At the E.T.A. French coast (04.15 hours) they descended and broke cloud at 6,000 feet, expecting to cross the French coast. Instead they found themselves over a lighted town which they thought must be in Spain and it was realized for the first time they were off track. Course was altered to 330ÌŠ for about 50 minutes and an M.F. fix was then asked for (approximately 05.05 hours). As Plympton was unable to plot they they were given a Q.T.E. of 200ÌŠ from Plympton (05.30 hours). At this time they were still inland. The coast was crossed at 05.50 hours and an S.O.S. fix was asked for. No reply was received except letter "K" reported. It is noted here that the last was heard of E/619 by the home base was a fix at 05.55 hours, position [mutilated word] 43.N 06.17E which E/619 did not receive.
The upper sky cleared and they were able to get an Astrofix 120 miles W.N.W. of Santander. (Black plotting from this would indicate that the course to the lighted town may have been about 50ÌŠ off the briefed route).
The Flight Engineer checked the petrol and it was found to be only sufficient to reach approximately 48ÌŠ N. Latitude, near the Brest peninsula. The captain decided that, rather than be forced down in enemy waters, it was preferable to proceed in the direction of Gibralter, though he did not hope to reach it. As they had no map of Spain they followed round the coast about five miles off.
About 12 miles north of Operto (time approximately 07.00-07.15 hours), it was decided to land and, as there was a heavy ground haze over the land, it was considered preferable to come down on the sea. The electrical apparatus was destroyed (V.H.F., I.F.F., GEE and MONICA) and the aircraft was put down on the sea about 200 yards off shore. The crew took to the dinghy but were picked up and taken to shore by some Portugese fishermen.
The aircraft was washed ashore and some light flak damage holes were found in the port mainplane, probably from the Viaduct defences as the crew did not think they were fired vat over Spain. The crew were soon taken in charge by the authorities and removed, but as far as they are aware no attempt at salvage was made by the Portugese authorities and they presume that the aircraft was allowed to lie and be broken up by the sea.
The following additional information was obtained from the crew. Prior to the operation the aircraft had been on a three-day inspection and compass check, and had not been flown since. The fuel load was 2,150 gallons. Three runs were made over the Target Area at high boost and high revs. No other use of high boost or hot air was made. There was no excessive climbing apart from that planned and only slight hoar frost on the windows was observed.source: Hugh Halliday